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SOME ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS 
Hugh S. Chandler 
The principal arguments considered are in some ways similar to those offered 
in Anselm's Proslogium, Chapters II and III. In addition, two 'quick' versions 
of the ontological argument are examined. Finally, I worry a bit about the 
ineffable One. The general line of attack is similar to a procedure employed 
by David Lewis in discussing Proslogium II. My approach to Proslogium III 
is based upon the idea that the appropriate modal logic for these matters is 
much weaker than the standard SS. The hope is that this alternative perspec-
tive reveals features worthy of notice. 
A Prototype Reference Fixing Description 
We begin by trying to construct the appropriate reference fixing description 
for our task. The aim is to use it in attaching the name 'Max' to a real, or at 
least possible (or possibly possible, or ... , and so on) entity worthy of worship. 
This maneuver simplifies the exposition of some fairly tangled matters. Un-
fortunately, it requires the assumption that we can name non-existent entities. 
Many philosophers say this is impossible. I If they are right, it is muddle-
headed, or at least question-begging, to use the name 'Max' in an argument 
purporting to show that such an entity actually exists. Let's take a quick look 
at this preliminary obstacle. 
Suppose we have before us all of the twenty-six parts necessary for the 
construction of a mechanical 'mouse.' Can we, or can we not, now name the 
particular 'mouse' that might be made of these parts? I think we can. In any 
case, it seems fairly clear we can produce a definite description that desig-
nates just that 'mouse.' The 'mouse' in question is the one we propose to 
construct of parts PI, P2, ... , P26. But, if this is so, why can't we now use 
that description to attach the name 'Mickey' to that possible 'mouse'? 
"The answer is obvious," someone may say, "there is, as yet, no such 
individual. How can the name 'Mickey' denote anything, given that the thing 
allegedly denoted is non-existent?" At this point, one is tempted to insist that 
Mickey does, sort of, in some sense, exist. The temptation should be resisted. 
Mickey doesn't exist in any way, shape, form, or manner. He is merely 
possible. The case provides strong grounds for thinking we can name, and 
discuss, particular individuals that are just plain non-existent.2 
"So you hold there is at least one artifact that is non-existent?" This is a 
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trick question. There is no such thing-that is to say, the artifact we have in 
mind (Le., Mickey) doesn't (yet) exist. But it does not follow that we have 
no particular individual in mind. 
Things become more difficult when we confront incorporeal entities-an-
gels, and heathen gods. Can we name spirits who do not actually exist?3 Here 
one cannot use the physical components, or stuff of which they might be 
made, to help insure unique reference. By hypothesis there are no such com-
ponents and no such stuff. Nevertheless, perhaps the chore can be done if we 
are given, or ourselves provide, enough information about the alleged entity's 
distinguishing properties. For example, it is not absurd to think there cannot 
be more than one Thor, since, necessarily, if he exists at all, it is he alone 
who hurls the thunderbolts on planet Earth. Of course Thor isn't Zeus. So 
hurling Earthly thunderbolts is not enough to constitute Thorhood. Perhaps 
deities like Thor and Zeus are distinguished in part by the company they keep. 
Thor has to cope with Odin and Frigg, Zeus with Hera and her children. 
Admittedly, there are lots of puzzles in this area that merit further discussion; 
but let's proceed to the main task. 
As a first effort in developing a workable reference fixing description we 
might try this: 
Let 'Max' designate the greatest person there is. 
Have we succeeded in naming someone worthy of worship? Some people will 
say we have; but others will deny it. A member of the latter group might think 
that a person (i.e., a 'concrete individual' who can remember, plan ahead, 
see the point of jokes, have hopes and fears, tell right from wrong, and so 
on) is ipso facto unworthy.4 Or they might hold that 'greatest' has no 
precise meaning in this context-hence the prototype naming device must 
misfire. Or they might claim that two or more candidates tie for the highest 
score in 'greatness.' 
There is another more obvious and decisive difficulty. Ontological argu-
ments are meant to prove the existence of a legitimate object of worship. If 
such a thing actually exists, and is a person, 'Max' may designate him or her. 
But, if there is no such thing, or there is, but it isn't a person (as defined 
above), then we have named someone else. Perhaps Max is a wise and pow-
erful Tralfamadorian (the Tralfamadorians inhabit one of the planets of a very 
distant star). 
Before we go any further, I would like to recommend four objectives for 
would-be ontological arguers: 
(1) We must insure that our reference fixing description succeeds in desig-
nating something-doesn't just misfire. 
(2) We must insure that the item designated is something possible (or pos-
sibly possible, or ... , and so on). 
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(3) We must insure that the designated item would not be unworthy (i.e. 
religiously, or morally, unacceptable) as an object of worship. 
(4) We must insure that there is some absurdity, or contradiction, in the 
supposition that the item designated is not real, Le. does not actually 
exist. 
Suppose our prototype reference fixing description successfully fulfills ob-
jectives (1), (2), and (4). The claim that it fulfills (3) would still be unwar-
ranted. If Max is a Tralfamadorian, there may well be serious religious and 
moral objections to worshiping him. And, for all the Anselmian fool, or the 
honest seeker, knows, Max may be that unworthy Tralfamadorian, given the 
prototype reference fixing description. Hence this description should be 
scrapped. 
The First Anselmian Argument 
Let 'Max' designate the greatest possible person. 
(a) Max does not exist. (Assumption for Reductio Ad Absurdum) 
(b) It is possible that Max should exist (i.e. Max is a possible person). 
(c) Hence, it is possible that someone (e.g. Max) should have a higher 
'greatness' score than the one Max actually has. 
(d) But this (i.e. (c» is absurd (presumably because we know a priori that 
Max has the highest score of any possible person). 
(e) Hence, Max must exist. (by R.A.A.) 
This argument is meant to be roughly similar to the one offered in Anselm's 
Proslogium, Chapter II. (One difference between this version and Anselm's 
is that this is explicitly about a possible person.) The new reference fixing 
description is used in assigning the name 'Max' to the greatest possible 
person, or at least to someone who ties for that rank. We assume, or pretend, 
that constraints (1), (2), and (3), have been satisfied. 
What about (4)? Here is a snag. From the point of view of the fool or the 
seeker, why shouldn't the greatest possible person be one who, in fact, does 
not exist? Perhaps we can get around this difficulty by admitting, or assum-
ing, that real existence-being actual-contributes a lot to one's 'greatness.' 
Imagine that the Theological Research Center in Pasadena is about to 
launch a Naming Device. It will consider every possible person in every 
'possible world' (Le., each 'world' which is metaphysically possible with 
respect to the actual world) and score each such person on a 'greatness' scale.5 
When that job is done, it will find the highest score achieved and award the 
name 'Max' to the winner. In case of a tie, the first maximal scorer among 
those examined wins. To keep everything clear and simple, we will stipulate 
that the 'greatness' conferring features are knowledge, power, and moral 
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excellence. The highest possible score in regard to each of these is 100 points. 
In addition, candidates get 100 bonus points for actual existence. How is the 
Naming Device to assign these points? Is it supposed to figure out the score 
each candidate would have if he or she really existed (i.e., find the candidates 
'hypothetical' score)? Or is it meant to work out each candidate's actual 
score? This question focuses attention on more or less the same difficulty 
David Lewis found in the Proslogium II argument twenty years ago.6 
Let's look at a particular pair of candidates. Pretend the two top contenders 
(Ralph and Perfecta) have these scores in two metaphysically possible 
worlds: 
World One World Two 
Ralph Perfecta Ralph Perfecta 
P:47 p:o P: 0 P: 100 
K: 85 K: 0 K: 0 K:100 
M: 12 M:O M:O M:100 
Bonus: 100 Bonus: 0 Bonus: 0 Bonus: 100 
Total: 244 Total: 0 Total: 0 Total: 400 
Suppose World One is the actual world. In that case, Perfecta is a possible, 
but non-actual, person. If she were real, she would score 400 points (100 
points for power, 100 for knowledge, 100 for moral excellence, plus the 100 
point bonus). But she doesn't exist. Hence, Ralph, who, as a candidate, seems 
to be her inferior in at least three ways, has a higher actual score. 
How is the Naming Device to handle this situation? If these were the only 
worlds in question, and the contest was just between Ralph and Perfecta, who 
would win? Clearly, if the Device were to go by the score each candidate 
would have if he or she really existed, Perfecta would be 'Max.' If, on the 
other hand, it goes by the score achieved in the actual world, and World One 
is the actual world, then 'Max' is Ralph. This latter policy would generate 
the sort of danger we faced earlier. It would prevent Fool and Seeker from 
knowing a priori that 'Max' designates a religiously and morally acceptable 
focus of worship. In order to avoid this, I think we should insist that the 
Naming Device rank candidates according to 'hypothetical' scores-Le., the 
scores they would achieve if they were real people. Under this procedure, 
'Max' designates Perfecta no matter which world is the actual world. We 
assume even the fool admits Perfecta would be acceptable. 
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Suppose, for a moment, that the prototype reference fixing description were 
still in use. Suppose, that is, that someone had won the name 'Max' on the 
basis of his, or her, actual degree of excellence. Under that procedure, it 
would indeed be absurd to suppose that Max does not exist. Fool and Seeker 
could know a priori that Max is a real person. Hence, they could know a 
priori that (a) is false. But, as we have seen, this procedure has undesirable 
consequences (i.e., it violates recommendation (3». 
Notice, in addition, that on this supposition it would be entirely possible 
for someone to have a higher 'greatness' score than the score Max actually 
has. Suppose World One is the actual world. In that case, Max is Ralph and 
has just 244 points. But World Two is possible. And, if World Two were 
actual, Perfecta would have 400 points. Hence, if the Naming Device were 
to go by actual scores, and the actual world is World One, it would be entirely 
possible that someone should have a higher score than Max. (c) follows from 
(a) and (b), so if (c) is absurd, one of those premises must be false. But, given 
the prototype reference fixing description, there would be no demonstrable 
absurdity. Fool and Seeker could not know a priori that (d) is true. 
I have suggested that the Naming Device should go by hypothetical scores. 
On this basis, it seems permissible to claim a priori knowledge that Perfecta, 
or someone her hypothetical equal, is 'Max.' But, once again, premise (d) is 
open to doubt. Suppose Max is Perfecta. For all Fool and Seeker know, World 
One is the actual world. Hence, Fool and Seeker can reasonably think that 
Max's actual score is, or at least might be, zero. 
The up-shot is that the first Anselmian argument is unpersuasive. We could 
make the assumption that Max does not exist patently absurd by requiring 
the Naming Device to go by scores achieved in the actual world. But this 
procedure would deny Fool and Seeker a priori knowledge that 'Max' is 
worthy of worship. Furthermore, if we rig the device in such a way as to yield 
that knowledge, premise (d) remains open to doubt. 
The Second Anselmian Argument 
We turn now to an argument based upon the assumption that necessary existence 
contributes to a person's 'greatness.' This is meant to be similar to the argument 
offered in Proslogium III. The objective is to demonstrate that Max necessarily 
exists. At this point, if not before, the choice of an appropriate system of modal 
propositional logic becomes crucial. It is customary for people discussing these 
matters to use S5; but I will use systems Band T.7 There are at least two reasons 
for this idiosyncrasy. (l) Working with the weaker systems allows me to re-apply 
something like the objection just offered (i.e., the Lewis-like objection to Pro-
slogium II). (2) The stronger systems (S4 and S5) are suspect in regard to 
metaphysical matters since they yield invalid patterns of modal reasoning 
when applied, for example, to the 'Chisholm Problem.'8 
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Here is a version of the Chisholm Problem. Mickey has been constructed 
of parts PI, P2, ... , P26. Consequently, we suppose, one of Mickey's essential 
properties is that he came into existence composed of a large number of those 
particular parts. Nevertheless, it seems clear that he could have been made 
of all but one of those parts-for example, PI could have been replaced by 
P27. Thus there is a metaphysically possible world (WI) in which Mickey 
comes into existence composed of parts P2, ... , P27. But then, in that world, 
he could have been made of all but one of those parts. And so it goes until 
we reach a world (W26) in which Mickey comes into existence made of parts 
entirely different from his original parts in the actual world. But, according 
to our supposition, this isn't possible. That is to say, the last world in the 
series (W26) isn't a metaphysically possible world. Both S4 and S5 force us 
to hold that if a world, W, is possibly, possibly, ... (and so on) possible, then 
W is just plain possible. Presumably, then, W26 is metaphysically possible. 
But this contradicts our hypothesis. Should we say that Mickey couldn't have 
come into existence made of all but one of his original parts? This suggestion 
is in itself counter-intuitive, and leads to various thorny thickets. For instance, 
surely Mickey existed before his assembly was absolutely complete. But, 
given this, how could that last screw have been essential to his existence?9 
It seems to me the best solution to the Chisholm Problem is to hold that 
the accessibility relation is not transitive (Le., to reject one of the character-
istic features of S4 and S5).10 Given that WI is metaphysical possible with 
respect to the actual world, and that W2 is metaphysically possible with 
respect to WI, it does not follow that W2 is metaphysically possible with 
respect to the actual world." Those who are fond of Lewis's' counterparts' can 
express the same idea by pointing out that the 'counterpart' relation is not 
transitive. I I Mickey has a 'mouse' counterpart that comes into existence com-
posed of a slightly different set of parts. And that counterpart has a 'mouse' 
counterpart with a further difference in parts. But it does not follow that this 
third 'mouse' is one of Mickey's 'mouse' counterparts. In short, S4 and S5 
are not valid systems of metaphysical modality. 
Incidentally, it is tempting to think that before Mickey's creation, the name 
'Mickey' was an abbreviation of a filled-in description something like: "The 
'mouse' (to be) constructed of parts PI, P2, ... , P26 (in such and such an 
arrangement, and so on)." But consider a metaphysically impossible state of 
affairs in which Mickey comes into existence composed of entirely different 
parts. In regard to that state of affairs, 'Mickey' designates Mickey; but "The 
'mouse' constructed of parts PI, P2, ... , P26 (and so on)" might well designate 
a different 'mouse.' Apparently, the name is a rigid designator across the 
metaphysically possible, possibly possible, ... and so on, worlds; but the de-
scription is not. If this is correct, the one is not an abbreviation of the other. 
The second Anselmian argument requires one more assumption, namely 
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that it is possible for a 'person' (as I have defined the term) to have necessary 
existence (i.e., to exist in all the worlds which are possible with respect to a 
given world), or, at least, that this is possibly possible, or that it is possibly, 
possibly possible, or ... , and so on ad infinitum. Somewhere out there there 
is at least one locally necessary person. 
Let's imagine the situation to be this: the metaphysically possible worlds 
form linked clusters of mutually accessible worlds. For example, in one such 
cluster there are worlds in which Perfecta has (local) necessary existence-
that is to say, she exists in every world which is possible with respect to such 
a world. In another cluster there is a world in which there is, so to speak, 
'nothing' -no physical objects, no space, no time, no Trolls, no Angels; in 
fact, no minds, no spirits, no people at all. (Are there sets, propositions, 
numbers? WelI maybe.) Let's calI this the 'Empty' World. If the 'Empty' 
World is possible with respect to a given world, W, then, of course, there is 
no one who has necessary existence in W.12 
The 'Empty' World gives the fool a quick S5 argument against the possi-
bility of a necessarily existent person: 
(a) If it is possible that a certain person should exist necessarily, then that 
person exists necessarily. 
(b) But it is possible that there should have been 'nothing' (i.e. no physical 
entities, no minds, no space, and so on). 
(c) Hence, it is impossible that someone should exist necessarily. 
Those who are committed to S5 must accept this conclusion or insist it is 
impossible for there be 'nothing.' It seems to me this insistence is quite 
unnecessary. Premise (a) is not guaranteed by valid modal logic. 
Here is a diagram of one conceivable arrangement of 'possible worlds.' 
The arrows represent 'accessibility' relations. 
Perfecta 
No Perfecta No Perfecta Perfecta Perfecta Perfecta 
Think of WO as a world in which there are people, planets, and so forth, but 
no Perfecta. 13 In fact she is impossible. Nevertheless, it is possibly possible 
that she should exist. That is to say, WI is a way things might have been in 
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WO; and, if WI had been the way things are, then Perfecta would have been 
a possible person. By way of contrast, in W5 Perfecta exists necessarily. She 
exists in every world which is possible with respect to W5. In fact, she is 
necessarily necessary, since she exists necessarily in all the worlds which are 
metaphysically possible with respect to W5. 
Arrangement One helps us spot two defects in the following (S5) argument: 
(a) If it is possible that a certain person should exist necessarily, then that 
person exists necessarily. 
(b) It is possible that Perfecta should exist necessarily. 
(c) Hence Perfecta exists necessarily. 
In the first place, Fool and Seeker have no particular reason to think it 
metaphysically possible that Perfecta should exist necessarily. (Presumably 
they both admit that her necessary existence is logically possible-Le., it is 
conceivable that she should exist necessarily.) For all they know, the actual 
world is WOo (Similarly, of course, someone who believes in Perfecta need 
not hold that the 'Empty' World is metaphysically possible. The believer may 
believe our world is W5.) Secondly (as I have already suggested in regard to 
the fool's argument) premise (a) is untrustworthy. Consider W2. If this is the 
actual world, then Perfecta actually exists, and it is possible that she should 
exist necessarily (W3 is accessible from W2). But she does not, in fact, exist 
necessarily since it is possible for there to be 'nothing' (i.e., the 'Empty 
World' is accessible from W2). We cannot know a priori that premise (a) is 
true. 
Is it conceivable that Perfecta should exist merely contingently? (Notice 
that in Arrangement One there is a world, W2, in which Perfecta has contin-
gent existence.) I think we should leave this matter to her worshipers. If they 
insist that this is simply inconceivable, we can modify the accessibility rela-
tions between W2 and both the Empty World and WI-we can make those 
relations nonsymmetric, and thus eliminate the unacceptable 'possibility.' 
That modification would yield a second arrangement of worlds: 
Arrangement Two 
Perfecta 
No Perfecta No Perfecta Perfecta Perfecta Perfecta 
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Perfecta has metaphysically necessary existence in W8 (the erstwhile W2). 
If W7 is the actual world, it is possible that Perfecta should exist necessarily, 
even though, in fact, she is non-existent. 14 
Consider this quick argument: 
(a) If it is possible that a certain person should exist necessarily, then that 
person actually exists. 
(b) It is possible that Perfecta should exist necessarily. 
(c) Hence Perfecta is a real person. 
Once again, Fool and Seeker have no particular reason to think (b) is true. 
But the more interesting point is that Arrangement Two (Le., modal system 
T) would make (a) false. 
Back to the second Anselmian argument (Le., the one in some ways similar 
to Proslogium III). We need a new scheme for awarding bonus points. What, 
for example, is Perfecta's hypothetical score in WO? If WO were the actual 
world, Perfecta would be impossible, but possibly possible. It seems to me 
the relevant feature in calculating her' degree of existence' bonus (in fact a 
debit) should be the shortest distance in accessibility steps to a world in which 
she is a real personY Perfecta is minimally two steps from existence. If we 
deduct, say, 1000 points for each such step, Perfecta scores -2000 in W6. 
Consider WS. Perfecta has necessarily necessary (i.e., OZ) existence there. 
Let's give her 2000 hypothetical bonus points for this accomplishment (1000 
points for each degree of necessity). Hence her total hypothetical score in 
WS is 2300. (What is Perfecta's hypothetical score in W2? Let's say 0 points 
for contingent existence-total score: 300.) 
Clearly the Naming Device needs a new set of instructions. Once again we 
are faced with a choice between having the device assess actual scores and 
having it assess hypothetical scores. The argument against the first policy is 
more or less a repeat of the one we used earlier. Suppose the actual world is 
WI. In that case, Perfecta's actual score is -1000, and the person with the 
highest score might be Ralph or the admirable Tralfamadorian. We mustn't 
let either of them be 'Max.' 
What, exactly, should our instructions to the Naming Device be? One is 
inclined to say something like the following: "Explore the possible worlds, 
and the possibly possible worlds, and the possibly possibly possible 
worlds, ... and so on ad infinitum, until you find a person with a score (count-
ing in the hypothetical bonus) such that it is not possible, and not possibly 
possible, and so on, that someone should have a score which is higher. Name 
that person 'Max.''' 
Unfortunately, if the 'Empty' World is somewhere in the network, those 
instructions may well guarantee a misfire. Consider a world in which Perfecta 
is two steps from non-existence. Surely there could be someone (perhaps 
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Perfecta herself) somewhere 'further out' who is minimally three steps from 
non-existence? The new bonus system and the 'Empty World' apparently have 
the consequence that there is no one in any world who's hypothetical 
'greatness' score is unsurpassable. 
My suggestion is that we instruct the Naming Device to find the person 
with the highest hypothetical score within, say, one hundred accessibility 
steps of any world which might plausibly be thought (by Fool, Seeker, or 
Believer) to be the actual one. This is messy, and it may make it possible for 
us to conceive of a being 'greater' than Max (i.e., someone 'further out'); but 
I can't think of a better procedure. 
Here, at last, is the second Anselmian argument: 
(a) Max lacks necessary existence-i.e., Max either exists contingently, or 
is non-existent. (Assumption for Reductio Ad Absurdum) 
(b) Hence, if someone did, in fact, exist necessarily, he or she would have 
a higher 'greatness' score than Max. 
(c) It is possible, or possibly possible, or ... {out to OIO~ that someone should 
exist necessarily. 
(d) Hence, it is possible, or possibly possible, or ... (out to OIO~ that someone 
should have a higher 'greatness' score than Max. 
(e) But this {i.e., (d)) is absurd {presumably because we know a priori that 
Max has the highest score of anyone out to OIO~. 
(f) Hence, Max exists necessarily. 
If a certain person does not exist, then, under the new bonus system, that 
person's greatness score is -1000, or -2000, or ... , and so on. Given that Max 
does not exist, there is a clear sense in which, if there were someone who 
existed necessarily, that person would have a higher score. In fact, such a 
person would have a score of more than 1000 points. In this sense, (b) follows 
from (a). If Max did exist necessarily, he or she would not have a higher score 
than Max would have. The very idea is absurd. But Max would have a higher 
score than we are supposing he or she actually has. 
Assume that Max is Perfecta and the only 'possible worlds' are those in 
Arrangement One. Premise (c) is clearly true. What about (d)? Just for the 
fun of it, pretend the actual world is W2. Max's score is 300, whereas if 
someone (e.g., Max herself) existed necessarily, then that person's score 
would be over 1000 points. Hence, if someone existed necessarily, that person 
would have a higher score then Max actually has. (d) follows from (a) - (c) 
provided it means: 
Cd') Hence, it is possible, or possibly possible, or ... (out to OIO~ that someone 
should have a higher 'greatness' score than the one Max actually has. 
On the other hand, it does not follow if it means: 
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(d") Hence, it is possible, or possibly possible, or ... (out to <>10<) that someone 
should have a higher 'greatness' score than the hypothetical score that 
earned someone the name 'Max.' 
Premise (e) is plausible only if we take it to refer to (d"). But (d") is not the 
legitimate consequence of the proceeding argument-Cd') is the proper con-
sequence. Hence, we must take (e) to say that (d') is an absurdity. Unfortu-
nately, the alleged absurdity is far from apparent. In fact, our arrangements 
seem to show that (d') might well be true. Consequently, we have no good 
reason to accept premise (e), or the argument as a whole. 
One Last Try 
At this point it would not be surprising for someone to suggest that an 
Anselmian ontological argument is more likely to be successful in proving 
the existence of something like the Neo-Platonic One than in proving the 
existence of a maximally great person. Let's consider an ontological argument 
designed for this purpose. 
First we will need to liberate the Naming Device in such a way as to admit 
non-persons as candidates. In fact, we might as well admit all conceivable 
individuals, properties, and relations. 16 "Greatness' will no longer be mea-
sured solely by one's degree of knowledge, power, and moral excellence. 
(The new criterion may well be left "open' -i.e., not fully defined.) 
Presumably, it is a matter of definition (a 'grammatical rule') that the One 
is either necessary or impossible. That is to say, in each logically possible 
world the One is either necessary or impossible. If we are thinking of some-
thing that (as we suppose) exists, but could fail to exist, or (as we suppose) 
does not exist, but could do so, then we are not thinking of the One. 
There are at least two ways of representing this modal situation. First, we 
might suppose the One must either exist in all the worlds that interest us (the 
'I-Worlds'), or in noneY (We may have no idea which of these is the case). 
Or, second, we might suppose the One exists in one group of I-worlds, but 
fails to exist in another. 
Consider the first option. Here is an analogy. Either platonism is correct in 
regard to numbers, or it isn't. If platonism is correct in this regard, then 
numbers are non-fictions in every mathematically possible world. If platon-
ism is correct in one such world, it is correct in all; and, if there is a world 
in which it is false, it is false in all. 
Here is a bad argument for platonism: 
(a) If there is a possible world in which platonism is correct in regard to 
numbers, then that sort of platonism is necessarily correct. 
(b) It is possible that platonism is correct in regard to numbers. 
(c) Hence, platonism is correct in regard to numbers. 
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The argument is bad because premise (b) probably means nothing more 
than that platonism is epistemicaLly possible. Thus understood, the premise 
is entirely compatible with the claim that it is equally possible that platonism 
is false. Similarly, it is epistemically possible that there are seven successive 
sevens in the expansion of pi, and equally possible that there is no such 
sequence. If, in fact, the sequence is there in the expansion, then, I suppose, 
it is there necessarily (Le., there are seven successive sevens in the expansion 
of pi in every mathematically possible world). Conversely, if there is a math-
ematically possible world in which it does not occur, then in no mathemati-
cally possible world does it occur. When we now say seven sequential sevens 
are possible, we do not mean there is a mathematically possible world in 
which that sequence occurs somewhere in the expansion. 
It is not obviously absurd to think of the One in a similar way. Either it 
exists in absolutely every I-world or it exists in none. When people say it is 
possible that there really is something of this sort, they just mean the One is 
epistemically possible. Unfortunately, on this view, given only that 'Max' 
designates something in some I-world, neither Fool nor Seeker can know a 
priori that it designates the One. 
I think it preferable to think of the I-worlds as forming two distinct groups: 
A and B. The One exists necessarily in all the worlds of group A, and is 
impossible in all the worlds of group B. Thus there are no accessibility links 
between group A and group B. (I imagine an 'empty' world in both groups. 
The One is perfectly at home in such a world. 18) 
Empty World 
The One 
A 
The One The One 
Empty World 
NoOne 
o d~ 
NoOne NoOne 
One consequence of this picture is that the necessity of the existence or of 
the non-existence of the One is, so to speak, a brute fact. The nature of the 
concept of the One does not guarantee its existence, nor is there any inco-
herence in the concept that precludes it. Hence, on this view, it is a mistake 
to argue that since there is no incoherence in the concept, the One must be 
possible. Or rather, if the concept is coherent, this shows the One is logically 
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possible; but it does not show that there is a metaphysically possible, or 
possibly possible, or. .. and so on, world in which the One is not a fiction. 
How should the Naming Device deal with these unlinked groups? If its 
search for candidates is confined to metaphysically possible worlds, possibly 
possible worlds, and so on ad infinitum, it may not find the One-or, at least, 
the fool can insist it will not, and the seeker may well notice that this is 
epistemically possible. We now want to give Fool and Seeker a priori assur-
ance that the One is a candidate. Consequently, we must make the Naming 
Device explore at least one of the worlds in group A. Perhaps we should have 
it examine all the I-worlds. 
Here is the final revision of the scoring system. The previous systems are 
scrapped, and we allow one thousand points for general 'excellence' and one 
million points for existing ih every possible, and possibly possible, and ... , 
and so on, world. But once again we face the old question. Is the Naming 
Device to go by actual, or hypothetical, scores, in deciding which candidate 
is 'Max'? If the actual world is in group A, then, we may suppose, the One 
is the winner. But suppose the actual world is in group B. In that case, if the 
Device is going by actual scores, the One is out of the running. Since we now 
want the One to win, the Device must (once again) go by hypothetical scores. 
The argument itself is reduced to bare essentials. This is because we cannot 
now say, or imply, that Max is metaphysically possible, or possibly possible, 
or ... and so on. Max is the One. For all Fool or Seeker know, the One may 
not exist in our local group of worlds. 
(a) Max does not exist. (Assumption for Reductio Ad A bsu rdu Ill) 
(b) Hence, it is possible that someone, or something, should have a i 
'greatness' score higher than Max's. 
(c) But this (Le. (b» is absurd. 
(d) Hence, Max exists. 
In effect, we are back to a familiar situation. If (as Fool thinks, and Seeker 
thinks possible) the actual world is in group B, it is obvious that anyone or 
anything that scores more than 0 will have a higher 'greatness' score than the 
actual score of the necessarily nonexistent One. Fool and Seeker have no reason 
to accept premise (c). Hence, this argument fares no better than the others. 19 
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NOTES 
1. Nathan Salmon and Alvin Plantinga take this line. See Salmon's Reference and 
Essence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 39, footnote 41, and Plantinga's 
The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), Chapters VII and VIII. 
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2. Salmon reports that both Saul Kripke and David Kaplan hold that this sort of naming 
can occur (see the footnote referred to in footnote 1). 
3. I am, for the purposes of this paper, simply assuming that incorporeal people are 
logically, and metaphysically, possible. 
4. As I understand them, Anselm and Aquinas belong in this group. 
5. Salmon takes a 'possible world' to be a maximal scenario describing a way things 
might have been. See his "The Logic of What Might Have Been," The Philosophical 
Review, Vol. XCVIII, No.1 (January 1989), pp. 03-34. On this view, my talk about 
'launching a Naming Device' is dangerous in that it tends to reinforce a mistaken view of 
'possible worlds.' 
6. See Lewis's "Anselm and Actuality," Nous, 4 (1970), pp. 206-12, reprinted in his 
Philosophical Papers, Volume I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 10-25. 
7. For an introduction to these systems see, for example, Brian Chellas's Modal Logic 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). 
8. See Salmon's "The Logic of What Might Have Been," op. cit. 
9. I pursue this cluster of problems a bit further in "Cook's Reductiones," Philosophia, 
Vol. 17, No.4, Dec. 1987, pp. 509-15. 
10. This is also Salmon's view, and it is powerfully defended in his "The Logic of What 
Might Have Been," op. cit. 
11. Lewis applies his 'counterpart' theory to the 'Chisholm problem' in 011 the Plurality 
of Worlds (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 243-48. 
12. Alvin Plantinga, and subsequently J. L. Mackie, consider the closely related, but 
more general, claim that 'No-maximality is possibly exemplified.' See Plantinga, op. cit., 
pp. 218-21, and Mackie's The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 
58-63. 
13. There are various things that might block Perfecta's existence. Perhaps, for example, 
WO is a world in which a morally despicable person ('Vilo ') creates, sustains, and controls, 
the whole universe. The suggestion is that Vilo and Perfecta are not compossible. (If 
Perfecta exists, she is omnipotent and does not tolerate that sort of thing.) 
14. This means we reject a characteristic schema of modal system B. We are down to T. 
15. More accurately, we should speak of 'giant' accessibility steps here. By definition, 
any two giant steps in a row take us to a world which is inaccessible from our starting 
point (i.e., the world from which we took the first step). This refinement is made necessary 
by the fact that many pairs of possible worlds are separated by an infinite sequence of 
worlds each one of which is accessible from all the others. 
16. Even this wide-open policy may not be liberal enough. Anselm seems to suggest 
that God isn't really either an 'individual' or a ·universal.' (See Monologium, chapters 
26-27.) So is God a 'relation'? I think Anselm would be inclined to deny that too. The 
underlying suggestion appears to be that God doesn't quite fit any of the categories 
delineated by the syntax of our natural languages. 
17. The notion of an 'I-World' is introduced here simply to avoid having to say what 
sort of worlds these are. Perhaps they are the logically possible worlds; but they might 
equally well be some proper subset of these. 
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18. In his Comment/wI Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi, Vol. Primum, Distinct. 
VIII, qua est. 1, Art. 1, Aquinas says, ..... when with regard to God we proceed by way of 
negation (removal), we first deny of Him all things corporeal; secondly also intellectual 
things, insofar as they are found among creatures, such as goodness and wisdom; and then 
there remains in our intellect only that he is, and nothing more. Finally we remove from 
him even this existence itself, insofar as it is in creatures, And then our intellect remains 
in a sort of darkness of ignorance, but it is by this ignorance, insofar as it pertains to our 
present life, that we are most perfectly joined to God, as Dionysius says (Ch. 7, On Divine 
Names) and this is a sort of darkness in which God is said to dwell." 
19. Robert McKim, and two referees for Faith and Philosophy, made very helpful 
criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper. 
